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Article

Earthquakes and Tremors in Statutory
Interpretation: An Empirical Study of the
Dynamics of Interpretation
Daniel A. Farbert
Everyone knows that the law changes and that Supreme
Court opinions are an important mechanism of change. (This
may be one of the few propositions so obvious that even law review editors are willing to accept without extensive footnoting.)
But we know very little about how the law changes. Looking
only at Supreme Court opinions, we might wonder whether the
impact of opinions covers a spectrum or whether opinions fall
into two distinct categories of significant but incremental
changes on the one hand, and major breakthrough opinions on
the other hand. Is there a "typical" Supreme Court opinion, in
terms of impact-and if so, what kind of case is typical and how
big is its impact? Surprisingly, little effort has been made to
provide any systematic evidence about these questions.
How judicial opinions change the law and whether they
should do so have received particular attention in the field of
statutory interpretation. William Eskridge's path-breaking article, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,is best known for its
normative claim that statutory interpretation should dynamically adapt to current social values.1 Eskridge pointed to the
sources of stress between existing rules and changing condi-

t Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. I
would like to thank Jim Chen for helpful comments on an earlier draft; Paul

Edelman and Mike Farber for assistance with the statistical analysis; and
Brett McDonnell for his insights into connections between law and complexity
theory. An earlier version of this paper was posted as part of an online symposium on dynamic statutory interpretation and is available at http://www.

bepress.com/ils/iss3/art11. Copyright ©2002, 2005 by Daniel A. Farber.
1. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987) (arguing for a cautious model of dynamic
statutory interpretation).
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tions. "As society changes, adapts to the statute, and generates
new variations of the problem which gave rise to the statute,"
he observed, "the unanticipated gaps and ambiguities proliferate."2 Moreover, he added, "the legal and constitutional context
of the statute may change." 3 Eskridge argued that his model
"depicts what the Supreme Court typically does when it interprets statutes." 4 Although his primary focus has remained
normative, Eskridge fleshed out his descriptive claim in his
later work. He argues that the "dynamism introduced by the
interpreter's perspective tends to be more pronounced over
time, as her cultural and political framework diverges from
that of the original drafters."5 But "if that framework becomes
irreconcilable with that of the drafters, statutory interpretation
becomes a discontinuous process of rupture and dramatic po6
litical shifts."
Eskridge's observations raise a host of issues about how
statutory interpretation actually operates-issues relating to
judicial methodology, cultural and political influences, and the
pace of legal change. Eskridge's primary focus was on methods
of statutory interpretation (originalist versus "dynamic"), but
his work also raises intriguing issues about the dynamics of legal innovation in statutory cases.
Rather than focus on judges' interpretive techniques, this
Article investigates the issues raised by Eskridge's contrasting
use of the terms "typical" (to describe the Court's general methodology) and "rupture" (referring to the occasional paradigm
shift). Some immediate questions come to mind: Is there such a
thing as a "typical" interpretation case? How do the typical
cases (however they are defined) relate to the extraordinary
ones? Is there a continuum? Or is there a dichotomy, with two
distinct classes of routine cases and blockbusters? More fundamentally, what kind of dynamic process is at work in statutory interpretation cases?
We all know that, as in the children's game, sometimes the
Court takes "baby steps" and sometimes it takes "giant steps."
But how often does it take each kind of step, and what dynamic

2.
3.
4.
in this
5.
(1994).
6.

Id. at 1480.
Id.
Id. at 1482. As discussed later, the notion of "typicality" is problematic
context. See infra Part III.B.
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 58
Id. For a case study of this interpretative "rupture," see id. at 66.
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drives the length of the steps? One way to get a handle on these
questions is to examine citation frequencies. An opinion that
takes a "baby step" will likely receive much less attention than
one that takes a "giant step." It will be decisive in fewer future
cases and will have to share the stage with other incremental
rulings about the same issue, thereby diluting its influence. Because it involves routine application of what Thomas Kuhn
called "normal science," 7 an opinion that takes a baby step will
also receive less attention from commentators. In contrast, an
opinion that takes a "giant step" will set the analytic agenda for
many later decisions. As a dramatic, paradigm-shifting legal
innovation, the opinion will also be more likely to command the
attention of commentators. Thus, the distribution of citation
frequencies, while admittedly an imperfect indicator, should illuminate the dynamics of interpretation.
This Article uses citation data for the Supreme Court's
1984 and 1990 Terms to examine three models of the dynamics
of interpretation.8 Under the first model, the random walk
model, the extent of an opinion's contribution to the law (and
thereby its influence) is determined by a host of independent
factors. These factors might include the subject matter, the
parties' shaping of the issue, the identity of the Justice drafting
the opinion, the amount of time since the statute was passed,
the ideological salience of the issue, and so forth. This model
produces a bell-shaped distribution of "step lengths," ranging
from baby to giant steps.
Under the second model, the bounded rationality model,
judges have bounded rationality and strong attachments to existing rules. This leads judges to take "baby steps" most of the
time, but to occasionally take "giant steps" when continued adherence to an existing norm proves untenable. In empirical
studies by various social scientists, this kind of model has produced frequency distributions that are roughly normal but have
a characteristic known as "leptokurtosis." This model may well
be what Eskridge had in mind; in any event, it was my own
prediction about the data.
The third model, the tectonic model, stems from complexity
theory (also known as chaos theory or fractal geometry). This
type of model applies to many dynamic processes-for example,
7. See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS passim (1962).
8. The choice of these Terms and other methodological issues are discussed infra in Part II.A.
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it fits the frequency distribution of earthquakes. The most important implication of this model is known as scaling: the same
patterns reproduce themselves (though with increased magnification) at every level of magnitude. 9 Because earthquakes provide such a vivid analogy to legal change, I will refer to this as
the tectonic model.
This Article uses citation data to explore statutory interpretation and tests three possible models. Part I discusses the
use of citation frequencies as a measure and lays out more carefully the three models described above. Part II describes the
methodology and presents the empirical data, including both
quantitative analysis and some qualitative assessments. Finally, Part III presents conclusions and suggestions for further
research.
I. PRIOR CITATION STUDIES AND POTENTIAL
STATISTICAL MODELS
This Article is not the first, nor hopefully the last, to investigate the dynamics of statutory interpretation. This part discusses briefly previous studies of the topic and my reasons for
adopting a different approach, before explaining the three models and their varying predictions.
A. INVESTIGATING THE DYNAMICS OF INTERPRETATION

Although the normative dimension of statutory interpretation has received the most attention, there have been some important empirical studies. These studies share a common technique. They focus on judicial methodology and examine the
various sources of authority cited in judicial opinions. In a nutshell, the general conclusion of these studies is that courts rely
on a range of authority, use an eclectic set of techniques, and
vary somewhat over time in their use of specific sources such as
legislative history. 10
9. These models are discussed in more detail infra in Part I.B.
10. The two leading works in this genre are probably Jane S. Schacter,
The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation:Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1998) and Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority
in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1073
(1992). For a discussion of works dealing specifically with the use of legislative
history by courts, see Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation,
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149 (2001). In addition, of course, there are many excellent
doctrinal analyses of recent opinions and historical studies of statutory inter-
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This is invaluable information, but it has its limits. First,
these studies essentially tell us what courts say about their decision making, rather than what they do when making decisions. Presumably, what courts say and what they do are related, but the strength of the connection is uncertain. Second,
although these studies suggest that courts are often dynamic in
the sense of consulting nonoriginalist sources, they reveal nothing about the magnitude of dynamism. Courts might exhibit a
very sleepy form of dynamism, in which courts use nonoriginalist material only to justify tiny incremental steps toward
changing the law "one case at a time." These studies cannot tell
us whether statutory interpretation moves by glacial evolution,
by fiery revolutions, or by some combination of the two. Just
how dynamic is "dynamic" in this setting?
Although undoubtedly an imperfect indicator, citation frequency can help us get a handle on these questions about the
pace of legal change. Clearly, a host of extraneous factors can
influence the number of citations that an opinion receives. In
general, however, citation impact is a plausible measure of the
significance of an opinion, that is, of how far it "moves" the law.
An opinion that contributes little new information about the
law will not be very useful to later courts, nor will it usually be
of much interest to commentators. Thus, citation frequency
provides at least a rough measure of how significantly an opinion changes the law.
Although citation studies are a burgeoning area of scholarship, most studies by academics have (perhaps not surprisingly) focused on citations of academic works, often with the
purpose of discovering which professor is the "fairest of them
all."'" A smaller body of work has investigated citations of
cases, focusing largely on two issues. One strand of studies has
focused on the "aging" of judicial authority, showing that judicial opinions generally have limited half-lives. 12 The other mapretation.
11. See generally Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1540 (1985) (discussing the most-cited law review articles and

their "objectively measured impact"); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal
Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409 (2000) (presenting data on the fifty "most-

cited legal scholars of all time").
12. See Peter Clinch, The Use of Authority: Citation Patterns in the English Courts, 46 J. DOCUMENTATION 287, 303-08 (1990); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent:A Theoretical and EmpiricalAnalysis, 19
J.L. & ECON. 249, 259 (1976); John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the CitationPractice of the California Supreme
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jor line of studies has focused on which judges are the most influential. 13 Only one article has apparently attempted to use
the distribution of citation frequencies as a gauge of the dynamics of the legal process.14
Unlike many other kinds of empirical data that might be of
interest, citation frequencies are readily available using current online search techniques. It is an old joke that social science research resembles a drunk looking for his keys under a
light post simply because he can see better there, but there is
something to the joke. Particularly for exploratory research, an
imperfect but readily available source of information is especially valuable and has a genuine edge over a more nearly ideal
but practically inaccessible source. At a minimum, this ready
availability is a good enough reason to collect the data in the
hopes of finding noteworthy patterns that will provide a
springboard for future research.
As with any measure, using citation frequencies has its
limitations. A recent study of judicial influence aptly explained
that citations "are at best a crude and rough proxy for measuring influence." 15 Several of the data limitations discussed in
that study are relevant here. "Super" precedents might be undercounted if they settle the law so effectively that no further
cases are brought (or at least appealed). Correspondingly, an
ambiguous precedent might be overcounted because lower
courts are unsure of when it is relevant or what it means.
Judges may also use overkill in citations, piling on multiple citations for the same basic point.' 6 In addition to these defects,
citation frequency will underestimate the boldness of some judicial interpretations if the statute is amended or repealed,
thereby eliminating the decision's relevance. To some extent,
these defects can be countered by considering citations in law
Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 423-27 (1977).
13. E.g., Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL.
L. REV. 299 (2004); David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence

of Individual Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371

(1999); Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court

Justices, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1998); William M. Landes et al., JudicialInfluence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD.271 (1998).
14. See David G. Post & Michael B. Eisen, How Long is the Coastline of
the Law? Thoughts on the FractalNature of Legal Systems, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
545 (2000) (discussed in more detail infra Part I.B.3).
15. Landes et al., supra note 13, at 271.
16. See id. at 273-75.
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reviews as well as in cases: academics are likely to devote considerable attention to "super" precedents, are less prone to
string citations, and are likely to be interested in Supreme
Court decisions connected with a statutory amendment. Overall, despite their possible defects, citation frequencies provide
the best available index of the significance of opinions in this
study.
B. THREE MODELS OF INTERPRETATION

We cannot know in advance whether any significant patterns will exist in the data, nor can we ever be positive that we
have correctly identified their causes even if we find such patterns. Before examining the data, however, it is helpful to have
some working hypotheses. This part considers three plausible
models of legal change and discusses the kind of statistical distribution associated with each one.
1. Model One: A Random Walk Through the U.S. Reports
One obvious possibility is that citation frequencies are
more or less random, that is, they are the product of unrelated
factors operating in different directions, which happen to balance out one way or another in a particular case. This model
could be tied to the view that the Court typically aims for a particular level of "narrow and shallow" opinions. 17 Among the possible factors influencing citation counts might be the specific
statutory language at issue, the quality of the parties' briefing,
the frequency of litigation in the area, the opinion's author, the
presence of dissent, subsequent legislative or administrative
actions, the clarity of the opinion, and the economic impact of
the decision, to name a few.
Trying to identify and measure these various factors is beyond the scope of this study. As it turns out, however, we may
be able to identify this kind of randomness without specifying
the causal links. A basic theorem of mathematical statistics
links this form of randomness with the famous bell-shaped,
normal distribution. More precisely, the central limit theorem
states that "the sum of a large number of independent random
variables will be approximately normally distributed almost
regardless of their individual distributions; any random variable which can be regarded as the sum of a large number of
17. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110
HARv. L. REV. 4, 15-21 (1995).
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small, independent contributions is thus likely to follow the
normal distribution approximately."1 8
We could not expect an exact correspondence between citation data and the normal distribution, if only because the normal distribution requires an infinite domain in both directions
while the number of citations to an opinion cannot be a negative number. In assessing deviations from normality, a few parameters are especially useful: Central tendency indicates that
the mean, the median, and the mode of a normal distribution
are the same; the skew parameter measures symmetry, which
is zero for the normal distribution (a normal curve is symmetrical rather than skewed in either direction); 19 and kurtosis
measures whether a curve is flattened out or unusually peaked,
compared with the normal distribution.2 0 Kurtosis for the normal distribution is sometimes given as three, 21 but the formula
used by the software for this study gives the normal distribution a kurtosis of zero.
I will examine later whether the frequency distribution for
citation counts has these characteristics. Note that in this
model, as with traits like human height and weight, there is a
clearly defined "typical case" and a continuum of increasingly
rare deviations from the norm. Thus, although an NBA player
might be unusually tall, it would make little sense to say that
his height "ruptured" size expectations.
2. Model Two: Sticky Norms and Paradigm Shifts
Speaking of ruptures makes more sense in terms of the
second model. In this model, for a variety of possible reasons,
judicial behavior is "sticky." Judges are reluctant to deviate
from existing norms, perhaps due to a belief in judicial restraint, and, hence, are usually prone to take only "baby steps."
It is difficult to move judges far away from the status quo.
When the status quo finally becomes untenable, however,
judges are likely to flip to a new equilibrium well removed from
the existing one. Thus, behavior is characterized by long bouts
of "normal science" punctuated by occasional "paradigm shifts."
Compared with a normal distribution, midrange changes are

18.

M.G. BULMER, PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICS 109 (2d ed. corrected re-

print, Dover 1979) (1967). For a sketch of one proof, see id. at 115-16.
19. See id. at 61-63.
20. See id. at 63-65.
21. See id. at 61-65, 111.
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disfavored-usually only small changes will occur, but large
changes will also be overrepresented compared with the normal
curve. 22 This kind of decision making is closely associated with
bounded human rationality, which leads individuals to use
heuristics and rules of thumb that distort their responses to
23
new information.
There are several reasons to expect that this model would

accurately capture statutory interpretation opinions. First,
judges are presumably as prone to bounded rationality as any-

one else. Thus, it would be surprising if their behavior did not
show some signs of stickiness due to the use of heuristics,
sticky norms, or "herding" effects. Second, since Supreme Court
Justices face few, if any, penalties for errors, they may be under less pressure than other actors to conform their behavior to
the theoretical standard of rational conduct. Third, studies

have shown significant evidence of this kind of behavior in a

variety of contexts, including stock market purchases, 24 congressional budgeting decisions, 25 and partisan voting mar26
gins.
Like the random walk model, this model is associated with
a characteristic statistical property called leptokurtosis; we expect sharper peaks and fatter tails than the bell curve. 27 The
software used in this Article classifies any distribution with a
kurtosis greater than zero as leptokurtic. Bryan Jones, a political scientist who has studied bounded rationality models, explains the implications of this statistical property:
Leptokurtosis in output data has an important implication for decisionmaking. Change data from human institutions have, in comparison to the Gaussian [normal] distribution, an excess of cases in the
central peak, an excess of cases in the tails of the distribution, but a
paucity of cases in the "shoulders," the area between the central peak
and the tails. The general substantive interpretation of these results
is that change in human institutions tends to be quite conservative-

22. For a general discussion of this kind of behavioral model, see Dan M.
Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67
U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000). For a discussion of whether this model is or is not
likely to apply to judges, see Eric Talley, PrecedentialCascades:An Appraisal,
73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87 (1999).
23. For an extensive discussion of how this idea applies in political science, see BRYAN D. JONES, POLITICS AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF CHOICE:
BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND GOVERNANCE (2001).
24. Id. at 164-68.
25. Id. at 174-75.
26. Id. at 171-73.
27. See id. at 164-67.
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most cases clustered around a central peak-but is subject to occasional quite large punctuation (the tails). On the other hand, moderate change, as represented in the shoulders of the distribution, seems
underrepresented-at least in comparison with the Gaussian. It
would seem that a hypothetical decision maker would have to be prepared either for virtually no change or a very large change-he or she
2
could not hope for moderate adjustments to changing circumstances. 8

According to Jones, however, the scale of these effects
should not be exaggerated. Distributions are generally not
greatly removed from normal, so that political and economic institutions "are not wildly out of line with what theories of adaptive behavior predict" but the distribution still leaves room for
' 29
"bounded rationality 'showing through.'
3. Model Three: Complexity Theory and Scaling Laws
The third model is developed in an innovative study of judicial citations by David Post and Michael Eisen. 30 They speculate that law may have the same branching properties that
generate certain fractal geometric objects, because a legal issue
can potentially sprout subissues, which in turn can sprout subsubissues, and that pattern continues. 31 Such fractal branching
is associated with power law distributions, in which frequency
varies as some power n of a basic parameter. Such distributions
are "produced at the boundary between order and disorder, at
the 'edge of chaos."'3 2 Power law distributions are "well nigh
ubiquitous in a wide variety of physical, biological, and social
systems." 3 3 Post and Eisen cite examples involving meteorology, demographics, biodiversity, and medicine, as well as the
34
example I have chosen as emblematic, earthquake sizes.
Based on a very large sample of New York Court of Appeals
cases and another sample of Seventh Circuit decisions, Post

28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 184.
Id. at 173.
Post & Eisen, supra note 14.
Id. at 552-58.

32.
33.

Id. at 568.
Id. at 569.

34.

Id. at 569 n.37. For another recent example, see Pablo A. Marquet, Of

Predators,Prey, and Power Laws, 295 SCIENCE 2229, 2229 (2002) (referring to

the "vast number of biological power laws"). General background on power
laws can be found in MANFRED SCHROEDER, FRACTALS, CHAOS, POWER LAWS:
MINUTES FROM AN INFINITE PARADISE (1991). Some other applications of

power laws to legal problems are discussed in Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities
Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 145 (2003).
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and Eisen find a good fit with their hypothesized power law
35
(especially for the New York data).
The earthquake example is especially evocative. Just as
tectonic plates encounter frictions and develop stresses, which
are then resolved by earthquakes, so the fabric of the law can
easily be imagined as developing similar stresses and strains.
Indeed, the fact that most of the Supreme Court's statutory
cases involve conflicts between the circuits suggests a collision
between opposing principles or rules of law, which the Court
36
must then somehow resolve.
Like the bounded rationality model, the tectonic model
predicts a distribution more sharply peaked than the normal
curve. It differs from the bounded rationality model in two significant respects. First, there is no expectation of producing
anything that resembles a bell-shaped curve. Second, power
laws have a crucial quality known as scaling. As Post and Eisen
explain, fractal objects (which exemplify power laws) have no
natural scale-any one section has the same structure (on a
smaller scale) as the whole. "No matter how high the magnification, no matter how deep into the structure you look, it always looks exactly, dizzingly, the same."3 7 More specifically,

this means that there is only a quantitative, and not a qualitative, difference between "normal science" and "paradigm shifting," just as the mechanisms and form of a small trembler are
the same as those of a major earthquake except for the degree
of violence.
When geologists conduct seismic studies, they observe
many small earthquakes and a few major earthquakes. This is
not because of any fundamental difference between "normal"
and "paradigm-shifting" seismic events. Rather, the same pattern holds even when distinguishing between tiny and merely
small seismic events, or between large and gargantuan ones.
Thus, in this model, paradigm shifts are just normal science
''writ large."

35.

Post & Eisen, supra note 14, at 571-83.

36. I originally planned to tabulate which cases involved circuit conflicts
and which involved some other basis for granting certiorari. I gave up on this
idea fairly quickly, as it became clear that a large majority of cases involved
circuit conflicts.
37. Post & Eisen, supra note 14, at 551; see also id. at 559, 569 (comparing the generation of legal argumentation with the "recursive process" of the
physical and biological world).
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II. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
The empirical research was conducted in two phases. The
first and somewhat more exploratory phase covered the U.S.
Supreme Court's 1990 Term. Based on the findings in the first
phase, the second phase was closer to the social science ideal,
using hypotheses and tests determined in advance and employing a more rigorous and detailed method of data collection.
A. METHODOLOGY

Having first decided to undertake positive rather than
normative research, I was then faced with the question of how
to investigate dynamic interpretation empirically. An examination of the literature revealed that relatively little use had been
made of the vast amount of data now available from electronic
resources such as Westlaw and LexisNexis. Bryan Jones's work
provided my initial inspiration, since it was not hard to put his
work together with the legal literature on sticky norms and
precedential cascades. 38 My initial working hypothesis was that
citation frequencies would follow the random walk model, with
modified normal distributions resembling Jones's findings,
symmetrical and single-peaked but with some leptokurtosis.
The sample for this phase of the study consisted of cases
from a single Supreme Court Term. To avoid the distorted comparison that would result from using cases from different
years-an earlier case has had more time to accumulate citations than a later one-I focused on a single year. In choosing a
particular year it was necessary to choose one early enough
that cases had ample opportunity to accumulate citations to
limit the effect of random variations in year-to-year citation
rates for individual cases. On the other hand, a more recent
year was necessary to reasonably represent the modern interpretative regime, rather than some earlier world such as the
Warren Court. With these considerations in mind, I semirandomly chose the 1990 Term.
Cases decided in the 1990 Term are located in Volume 111
of the West Supreme Court Reporter. Volume 111 contains 231
cases. I excluded per curiam opinions (including summary reversals and remands) and cases falling within the Court's
original jurisdiction, which left 117 appellate cases decided
with full opinion. Because the dynamics of statutory interpreta-

38.

See JONES, supra note 23.
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tion is the focus of the study, I excluded any case that was partially constitutional or common law in nature, so that all cases
in my study involved purely statutory interpretation. 39 I also
eliminated cases that involved the interpretation of federal
statutes but had begun in state court. An issue arising in state
court might naturally garner additional citations in other state
courts, which could lead to a bias because state decisions vastly
outnumber federal decisions. This left me with sixty-five
40
cases.
I next set about finding how many times each case had
been cited. 41 This process proved to be much easier than expected because West's KeyCite feature presents information
about citations in different ways, such as whether the citation
is by a court or a periodical, the citation date, which key number in the opinion is being cited, and whether the case is discussed, criticized, or merely cited without comment. KeyCite
automatically generates citation counts in these various categories. As I began collecting the data, I noticed almost immediately that the numbers seemed to be quite scattered, with little
apparent clustering around a central value. After gathering the
total number of citations for all of the cases (including citations
in other cases as well as secondary sources), I went back and
obtained a separate count on citations in judicial opinions to
investigate whether combining citations from different sources
was affecting the results. The bulk of the noncase citations
were from law reviews, but I did not tabulate them separately
in this phase of the study.
Using QuattroPro, a simple spreadsheet program of the
kind commonly packaged with word processing programs, I
next set about analyzing the data, first finding averages,
means, kurtosis, and skew figures. I then constructed frequency distributions and looked at various permutations such
as log log and semi-log graphs. Finally, I experimented with fitting other curves to the data, such as exponential or Poisson
39. Note that I included cases involving interpretation of the federal procedural or evidentiary rules.
40. In most cases, the inclusion decision was easy to make, but there were
a few tough calls. The most notable was Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722
(1991), a habeas ruling which mentions the applicable federal statute but appears to be almost entirely based on a common law theory of equitable discretion. Because the statute seemed so incidental to the decision, I ultimately excluded it from the data set.
41. The search was conducted on February 2, 2002. The complete list of
cases and citation counts can be found in appendix table A.
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distributions, using regression analysis to test the goodness of
fit. 42
In looking at the figures on case versus total citations, I
was surprised that some of the cases which were most familiar
3
to me, such as Johnson Controls,4 had very few citations in
later opinions compared to the number of noncase (primarily
law review) citations. 44 I then set about calculating the ratio of
case to noncase citations. A regression of the number of case
versus noncase citations for each opinion showed little correlation. Finally, I examined fifteen opinions more carefully. I took
the ten opinions with the highest number of citations, and divided them into two groups (predominantly case versus predominantly noncase citations). For comparison purposes, I also
read the five cases closest to the median number of total citations.
From this first phase, I got a sense of what data were
available as well as some of the most readily usable methods
for processing the data. I also formed some hypotheses about
citation distributions. With this knowledge, I then set about the
second phase of my research. This time, I was somewhat more
systematic, using a random method to choose which Term to
study, formalizing the coding to some extent, and formulating
45
models in advance to be tested against the new data set. Hav42. For readers who are unfamiliar with regression analysis, Sage Publications, Inc. has published several helpful handbooks for social science students in its series "Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences." See, e.g.,
CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN, INTERPRETING AND USING REGRESSION (Sage Univ.
Papers, Quantitative Applications in the Soc. Sciences, Series No. 29, 1982);
MICHAEL S. LEWIS-BECK, APPLIED REGRESSION: AN INTRODUCTION (Sage
Univ. Papers, Quantitative Applications in the Soc. Sciences, Series No. 22,
1980); LARRY D. SCHROEDER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGRESSION ANALYSIS:
AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE (Sage Univ. Papers, Quantitative Applications in
the Soc. Sciences, Series No. 57, 1986).
43. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (holding
that an employer could not exclude women of childbearing age from a job that
involved potential risk of birth defects or miscarriage).
44. When I reran this query on August 25, 2004, I found 176 case cites,
803 law review cites, and 604 citations in other secondary sources.
45. I instructed my research assistant to choose a year between 1982 and
1995 at random (excluding 1990), which he did by drawing a slip of paper out
of a hat. The chosen year was 1984. Following the standards above, he then
classified the cases as either statutory or nonstatutory. There were approximately ten cases about which he was uncertain, so I made the decision. I later
removed two cases he had classified as statutory but which seemed to me
clearly constitutional in nature. He then collected a more detailed set of data,
including separate counts for state and federal citations, law reviews, page
lengths, and case descriptions. The searches were conducted on March 18, 21,
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ing received this data, I again calculated means, medians, kurtosis and skews, set up frequency diagrams, and did log log regressions to test the third model. Thus, the second phase more
or less tracked the first, except with a new data set, somewhat
more care, and a greater degree of planning.
B. FINDINGS

The two Terms were rather unlike one another in some
ways. The composition of the Court changed, with the departure of Justices Brennan, Burger, and Powell, and the addition
of Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Souter. There were more cases
in 1984 than in 1990, which corresponds with the recent trend
toward smaller Supreme Court caseloads. 46 Moreover, there
was also a difference in judicial methodology between the two
Terms: the Court was only one-third as likely to cite legislative
history in 1990 as in 1984; the later Term was apparently more
staunchly textualist than the earlier one. 47 Nevertheless, the

citation patterns from the two Terms were strikingly similar.
1. The 1990 Term
The data for the 1990 Term are displayed in appendix table A. As can be seen from glancing at the data, there was a
large range in terms of numbers of citations per case. Considering the total number of citations (including both case and noncase citations), the mean was 613, but the median was only
419. The standard deviation was 222, and both the leptokurtosis (3.08)48 and the skew (1.84) were pronounced. On average,
citations were evenly divided between case and noncase cites,
with a mean of 276 noncase cites. The distribution for noncase
cites was even more skewed, with a median of 160, a standard
deviation of 322, and both high kurtosis (7.8) and skew (2.7).
Figures 1 and 2 break out case and noncase citations, which is
somewhat more enlightening.

and 29, 2002. Eighty-six cases remained in the sample for the 1984 Term. A
complete list of these cases can be found in appendix table B.
46. For statistics on the two Terms, see The Supreme Court 1990 TermLeading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177, 419-26 (1991); The Supreme Court
1984 Term-Leading Cases, 99 HARv. L. REV. 120, 322-29 (1985).
47. See the table in Vermeule, supra note 10, at 189.
48. Recall that the formula used by this software makes zero the kurtosis
of the normal curve.
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Figure 1: Case Citations to Cases Decided in the
1990 Term
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Figure 3: Log Log Plot of Noncase Citations to Cases
Decided in the 1990 Term
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Figure 4: Log Log Plot of Case Citations to Cases
Decided in the 1990 Term
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Testing for a power law requires a log log plot. 49 The regression analysis indicates a close fit between the data and the
models, with an R 2 of .83 for the noncase citations, and an almost identical R 2 for the regression with case citations. In both
instances, the slope coefficient was about 1.2 and much larger
than the estimate of standard error. As an inspection of the
plots in figures 3 and 4 shows, the log log plots are much "better behaved" and closer to linear than in figures 1 and 2.
As mentioned earlier, the apparent divergences between
case and noncase citations intrigued me, and the regression
analyses confirmed my impressions. Although an increase in
the number of case citations predicted a higher average number
of noncase citations, almost none of the variance was explained
(R2 = .07).50 When I divided the ten most cited cases into two
groups, based on the proportion of judicial versus nonjudicial
citations, the difference between the groups was striking. Of
the five cases in this group that were most frequently cited by
courts, all but one dealt with a procedural issue, and the exception dealt with Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) preemption. 51 The five cases most frequently cited in
law reviews were much different. 52 All but one of the cases in49. More complete results for the regression analyses for the 1990 Term
are in appendix table C. Using a single-tailed t-test, the coefficients are significant at p < .01. (A two-tailed test would not be appropriate because we
know in advance that the coefficient is not positive; otherwise there would be
far higher impact than lower impact cases, which seems unlikely.) For an explanation of the use of the t-statistic and a useful table, see SCHROEDER ET
AL., supra note 42, at 46-49, 82-83.
50. Although weak, the positive relationship was genuine. The coefficient
was significant atp < .025.
51. The five cases were FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990) (ERISA
preemption); Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990) (involving
the statute of limitations in a Title VII case against the federal government);
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991) (addressing the burden of proof in certain bankruptcy procedures; also the most highly cited statutory case of the
1990 Term); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (evaluating habeas procedure); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (analyzing
whether a forum selection clause violated a maritime statute).
52. The five cases were EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991)
(examining the application of Title VII on foreign soil); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (applying statutory and constitutional requirements of originality in copyright case); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (evaluating the enforceability of
an agreement to arbitrate a discrimination claim); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173 (1991) (dealing with an abortion counseling restriction); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (examining state sovereignty for interpretation
of civil rights law).
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volved discrimination law. The fifth case involved the statutory
and constitutional requirement of originality in copyright law,
an issue with strong implications for free speech. In short, the
courts seemed most keenly interested in procedure, while the
commentators were drawn to cases with quasi-constitutional
overtones.
2. The 1984 Term
The shapes of the distributions in the more careful 1984
study were similar. For the total citations, the mean was 741,
while the median was only 528. The standard deviation was
quite large (712), and both the skew (1.8) and the leptokurtosis
(2.9 on a scale with 0 for the normal curve) were pronounced.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of citations in all judicial opinions. As figure 6 illustrates, the log log plot is once again much
better behaved.

Figure 5: Judicial Citations to Cases Decided in the
1984 Term
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Figure 6: Log Log Plot of Judicial Citations to Cases
Decided in the 1984 Term
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More focused counts were also tabulated for the 1984 data,
one of which tracked citations by federal appellate courts. Here,
the mean was lower (153), but we have the familiar story in
terms of kurtosis (11 in this instance) and skew (2.9). Again,
the plots tell the tale. As figures 7 and 8 show, the ordinary
plot for federal appellate citations is highly skewed and curved,
while the log log plot approaches linear. 53 The regression results confirm this impression. The R 2 on the log log plot was
.87, with a coefficient of -1.8 (significant at p < .01). Rather
than relying on a "noncase" count as in the 1990 analysis, the
analysis of the 1984 Term included a specific breakdown for citations in law reviews. Figures 9 and 10 show the relevant distributions. As figure 10 indicates, the log log regression again
comes out quite well, with an R2 of .83 and a coefficient of -1.6
(significant at p < .01).

53. Complete results from the regression analyses for the 1984 Term can
be found in appendix table D.
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Figure 7: Federal Appellate Court Citations to Cases
Decided in the 1984 Term
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Figure 8: Log Log Plot of Federal Appellate Court
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Figure 9: Law Review Citations to Cases Decided in the
1984 Term
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Figure 10: Log Log Plot of Law Review Citations to
Cases Decided in the 1984 Term
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As a check on the relationship between different forms of
citation, I also ran a regression of federal court citations versus
law review citations. The regression confirmed that the features of opinions that interest federal judges overlap only
slightly with those that interest academics. The R2 for the
model was only .07, meaning that virtually none of the variance
was explained. The coefficient was positive and significant (p <
.05), suggesting that some small overlap of interests exists but
that it is dwarfed by the other divergences.
Once again, an examination of the five most cited cases in
each category was revealing. Of the five cases with the highest
number of judicial cites, three dealt with procedural issues, one
involved ERISA, and one involved an erroneous jury instruction regarding municipal liability under the Civil Rights Act of
1861. 54 Consistent with the 1990 Term, the list of cases most

cited in law reviews was quite different. It contained a leading
copyright case, a disability discrimination case, a case on arbitration of statutory claims, and a quasi-constitutional case on
state sovereign immunity. 55 The fifth case dealt with an important issue in administrative law regarding judicial review of
nonenforcement decisions by administrative agencies. 56 As in
the 1990 Term, the only case on both lists from the 1984 Term
dealt with arbitration of statutory claims.
III. IMPLICATIONS
What, if anything, does this all mean? Given the fact that
only two Supreme Court Terms were studied and that the
methodology was fairly crude, any conclusions have to be
somewhat tentative. Nevertheless, in my view, the data provide
54. The five cases were United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) (applying the plain error rule); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724 (1985) (involving ERISA preemption of a state statute; this case also came
very close to the top five list for law reviews); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808 (1985) (questioning municipal liability for inadequate police
training); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (determining appropriateness of attorney's fees); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that antitrust claims may be arbitrated; this is the only case on both lists).
55. In addition to Mitsubishi, the other cases were Alexander v. Choate,
469 U.S. 287 (1985) (involving a claim of discrimination based on disability);
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (concerning a copyright infringement claim); and Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (evaluating a state's sovereign immunity in a Rehabilitation Act claim).
56. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
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reasonable support for two conclusions. The first relates to the
dynamics of statutory interpretation. Taken as a whole, the
data seem most consistent with the tectonic model.5 7 The second and somewhat firmer conclusion is that the idea of a typical statutory interpretation opinion is quite problematic. In
particular, the opinions that are likely to come to a law professor's mind as typical are likely to be quite different from those
that a judge or litigator would find typical. After discussing
these conclusions, I close with a brief discussion of possible directions for further research.
A. TOWARD A THEORY OF TECTONIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
Earlier in this Article, I sketched three models of the dynamics of statutory interpretation. The first of these models,
the random walk model, seems clearly inconsistent with the
data. The random walk model implies a normal distribution of
citation frequencies. The data for both years and for all categories of citations were not at all normally distributed, as can be
seen visually from inspecting the various figures and statistically from the high skew and kurtosis numbers.
The second model, the bounded rationality model, cannot
be rejected quite as confidently. This model predicts leptokurtosis, and while the data indeed display leptokurtosis, there
can be too much of a good thing. The "boundedness" part of the
model predicts leptokurtosis, but the "rationality" part of the
model suggests that deviations from the normal distribution
will not be too severe. Previous empirical support for this model
has involved distribution much less skewed than found here. 58
On balance, despite my initial support for this model, the data
do not support it.
This leaves the third model, the tectonic model, which performed very well and provided the best fit to the data. First, the
high R 2 for each of the log log regressions shows that the model
explains much of the variance in citation frequencies. Second,
the coefficients for both years and for different categories of citations are strikingly similar, ranging between minus one and
57. Since only two other models were tested, however, it remains possible
that some other model would be superior.
58. This becomes clear from comparing the charts presented by JONES,
supra note 23, at 173, 175 and 178 with those presented in this Article. The
charts presented by Jones are much closer to the "bell-shaped" idea of the
normal distribution, although still significantly distorted.
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minus two. (Basically, in each case, the number of cases N with
a given number of citations per case C is given by a formula
roughly of the form, N = kC - 1.5 , where k is a constant that varies for each set of citations.) Indeed, Post and Eisen obtained
similar coefficients for the data from the New York Court of
Appeals and for their combined data set from the Seventh Circuit. 59 This suggests that the good fits are not merely happen-

stance, but instead reflect some underlying structural similarity between the various sets of data.
Because such a broad range of phenomena is subject to
power laws of this kind, the existence of this law does not tell
us much about the underlying mechanism. That mechanism
might or might not take the form of the branching pattern discussed by Post and Eisen. 60 What we do know from the existence of such a power law, however, is that whatever mechanism exists covers a wide range of scales. In other words, the
same basic mechanism should generate both tremors (opinions
which add little to the law and gather only a few cites) and
earthquakes (opinions which greatly shift the law and gather a
high number of cites).
The seismic analogy would support more serious consideration of the idea that opinions are generated by stresses and
fractures in the law, which are resolved in large or small ways
by shifts on one side of the fault line or the other. These shifts,
in turn, may generate stresses elsewhere, resulting in later
seismic events involving related legal issues. It is common to
speak of "shifts in the legal landscape." The tectonic model suggests that this analogy may be more exact, and that these
shifts may actually resemble earthquakes in some quantitative
way.
B. THE ELUSIVE "TYPICAL" OPINION

As we saw earlier, there is a tremendous spread among citation counts. Some Supreme Court opinions have been cited
only a few dozen times; others have been cited one or two thousand times. The median opinion may have ten times as many
cites as one kind but only a fifth as many as the other. In sum,
the most typical attribute of any opinion, apparently, is to be
atypical.

59.
60.

Post & Eisen, supra note 14, at 572-73, 583.
Id. at 552-58.
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Singling out particular opinions for study requires careful
thinking about what to look for in an opinion. Taking the median opinion is probably the best we can do in terms of identifying what cases are representative of the whole set of statutory
interpretation opinions. However, if we are interested in how
major new law is made, rather than in seeing how the Court
handles fairly routine cases, these median cases may give a
misleading impression. New law is disproportionately made by
a dozen or so cases at the high end of the statistical distribution, and a study of median or run-of-the-mill cases will exclude
these blockbusters. Thus, if we are interested in the Court's
methodology, the median cases may be more revealing; if we
are interested in how statutory interpretation shifts, however,
we might be more interested in the outliers.
Determining what cases to study is further complicated because case impact is not unitary. Probably the clearest finding
of this study is that there are two almost completely independent dimensions of case impact. The characteristics that lead to
citations by courts seem to be quite different from those that
lead to citations by legal academics. Perhaps this should not be
a surprise. We already know that courts and academics differ
greatly in which secondary sources (such as law review articles)
they cite. 6 1 It is, nonetheless, striking to see just how little correlation there is between judicial and academic citations of Supreme Court cases.
One might view this finding as simply another confirmation of the well-known (and apparently widening) chasm between the legal academy and the profession, but it would
probably be a mistake to view the split as merely reflecting an
"ivory tower" temperament among professors. The cases cited
most heavily in law reviews involve issues of genuine social importance, even if they are not issues that give rise to extensive
litigation. In the 1990 Term, the case most heavily cited by
courts involved the burden of proof in certain bankruptcy proceedings. This issue is apparently important to bankruptcy
judges and practitioners, as well as to a large numbers of people who are either bankruptcy petitioners or their creditors.
But, in some sense, it does not have the same fundamental social significance as the discrimination cases that had the lion's
61. See generally Deborah Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 871 (1996) (comparing law review articles most frequently
cited by judges to those most frequently cited by academics).
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share of the attention in the law reviews. We should resist the
temptation to dismiss the judicial citation figures as merely indicating the limited intellectual perspective of the profession or
the law review citation figures as merely indicating distance
from the real world of legal practice. Instead, we should view
them as reflecting independent but equally significant dimensions of legal impact.
Academics who write about statutory interpretation probably need to be particularly careful because their ideas of typicality are likely to reflect one of these dimensions much more
than the other. Thus, in selecting individual cases for analysis,
it is important to consider opinions that have a dramatic impact on litigation and practice, as well as those that relate to
important social issues. A useful convention might be to routinely report both judicial and law review citation figures
whenever discussing a specific statutory interpretation opinion,
or at least the ratio between the two figures.
C. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

It is often much easier to generate new ideas for empirical
research than to actually carry them out. With that caveat in
mind, here are three ideas for extending the line of research
presented in this Article.
The first idea is simply to solidify the methodology used in
this paper. The methods could be made more rigorous by developing a more formal procedure for coding cases as statutory or
nonstatutory. Moreover, it would be possible, though time consuming, to use KeyCite to distinguish between citations to the
statutory and nonstatutory holdings of the same opinion. Also,
two years of Supreme Court opinions are not really enough.
Examining a greater number of years would provide greater
confidence in the results. Perhaps more importantly, it should
be possible to test some alternative models against the tectonic
model, which again would provide a greater level of confidence
about the conclusions. And, of course, the level of statistical sophistication could well be increased.
The second idea is to expand the analysis to include various characteristics of each opinion. Using multivariate regression, for example, it would be useful to know whether a particular Justice's work has greater impact on lower courts or on
academics. It would also be useful to categorize the cases (for
example, as procedural or substantive). Perhaps most intriguing, the citation impact analysis could be combined with previ-
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ous work on the sources of authority in judicial opinions. Holding other variables constant, it would certainly be interesting to
know whether textualist opinions tend to have greater or lesser
impact than opinions relying on legislative history.
Third, longitudinal extensions of the study would shed
more light on the mechanisms involved in citation impact.
Cases may differ from each other primarily in their amount of
immediate impact or in their staying power. Moreover, by examining cases which actually discuss rather than merely cite
the opinion (another useful feature of KeyCite), one could
probably get a better grip on the extent to which cases are cited
because the holdings raise new issues as opposed to settling old
ones. It would also be interesting to connect the citation information with the age of the statutory provision. Dynamic interpretation, in the sense of updating old statutes, might show up
fairly clearly in the form of high impact opinions involving old
statutes. It would certainly be useful to get some sense of how
common such opinions really are and when they arise. It would
also be useful to determine whether these cases arose because
changing social or economic conditions have produced new
types of litigation; because changing social values made old
rules seem inappropriate; or because of changes elsewhere in
the legal landscape.
In addition to these possible directions for formal empirical
research, this Article also has some implications for the kinds
of informal case studies that are more common among law professors. As we have seen, the idea of typicality seems to be
quite problematic in this area, and legal scholars need to be
sensitive to the issue of case selection. Scholars also probably
need to make a special effort to include cases with high levels of
judicial citations, even if those opinions are not on issues that
legal academics consider "sexy."
CONCLUSION
The central findings of this study can be simply stated. The
data are sharply at odds with the first model tested, that of a
bell-shaped curve. The citation frequencies deviate greatly from
the normal distribution. The data reflect leptokurtosis, the statistical attribute associated with the second model, that of
bounded rationality. (This is also a model in which decisions
mostly fall into two separate classes: small incremental
changes and major ruptures of existing law.) Unlike the leading
studies of bounded rationality, however, the data showed more
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extreme deviations from normality, suggesting that something
more than sticky norms or bounded rationality may be involved. The third model (tectonic statutory interpretation) provides a good fit for the data. Thus, although this study falls far
short of "proving" the validity of the tectonic model, it seems to
62
be the best working hypothesis.
The tectonic model serves as an important addition to existing visions of statutory interpretation. Viewing appellate
opinions as seismic events-large or small legal shifts that resolve stresses between conflicting legal forces while sometimes
creating new stresses-may prove to be a fruitful perspective. If
nothing else, it is a good reminder to expect the unexpected. If
this model is correct, every now and then, just as with earthquakes, we can expect to run into legal shifts of extraordinary
magnitude, far out of line with past year-to-year experience.
The model suggests that these megacases are extraordinary in
their impact, but not in the mechanisms that produce them.
Much of legal scholarship is in essence a search for fruitful
metaphors. The earthquake metaphor may turn out to be not
only striking but quantitatively valid.
Another implication of this study is that we should be very
cautious about the concept of the "typical" statutory interpretation case. The idea of a "typical" interpretation case is problematic in three ways. First, the diversity of Supreme Court rulings is surprisingly great. At the extremes, one case in the 1984
TerM6 3 had been cited only once by a later federal appeals court
as of 2002, while another case 64 garnered over eleven hundred
federal appellate citations during the same period. Second,
opinions seem to have two, largely unrelated, types of significance. The amount of attention an opinion receives from lower
federal courts has almost no correlation with the attention it
receives in law reviews; an academic's impression of the "typical" opinion likely differs from that of a judge or lawyer. Third,
averages are relatively meaningless because the distributions
have such long right tails. Thus, at least if typicality is judged
by citation impact, speaking of the "typical" interpretation case
is somewhat like speaking of the "typical" nation-state, given

62. See supra Part III.A for further discussion.
63. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta v. Bartow County Bd. of Tax Assessors,
470 U.S. 583 (1985) (upholding Georgia tax on bank shares as consistent with
31 U.S.C. § 3124 (a)).
64. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985) (applying the plain error
rule).
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dimenthe huge variations among nations on various different
65
sions such as per capita income and population.
Regardless of the ultimate validity of the conclusions
reached in this study, citation impact figures are a valuable
and largely untapped source of information about the dynamics
of statutory interpretation, which cry out for further investigation. They could also help identify which individual cases are
worth in-depth study. Legal scholars notoriously focus on normative matters-typically, what the courts should be doing in
some area of the law. Important as those questions are, there is
also much to be learned about how the judicial system actually
operates.
The results reported in this Article are limited to a particular type of case in a particular Supreme Court Term, and no
doubt much could be done to increase the methodological sophistication of the study. One might say that we are now in the
position of casual explorers who have found paintings in the
mouth of a cave. The real treasures are probably farther inside
the cave, and with luck they will receive the attention of professional investigators. Even these tentative, preliminary results, however, provide tantalizing hints of future discoveries.

65.

See supraPart III.B for a discussion of the typicality question.
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772

790

614

176

588

343

245

23e
2139

1r6
1673

6
466

358

57

301

Uccupational batety
and Health Act of
1970 (29 U.S.C. § 651
Pt Rpno)

400 u.,

1o

ilierlallunai union,

UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc.

499 U.S. 315

4'5

I..

'soo u..

-o,

auc

rregnancy
Discrimination Act
(42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k)); Title VII
of the Civil Rights
Act (42 U.S.C.

United States v.
Gaubert

Home Owners' Loan
Act of 1933 (12 U.S.C.

Omni Outdoor

U.S.C.

ivieniesiey v.

....

noLuage oavings iAss n

v. Commissioner

§§

1, 2)

o
isouse
2
Haheas Corpus (28

i.fl.U. s iuuiia)
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499 U.S. 585

Carnival Cruise Lines, Forum Selection
Inc. v. Shute
Clause (46 U.S.C.

btevens v.
Department of the
Treasury

500 U.S. 72

Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of
1967 (29 U.S.C.
9 9 -1N

International Primate Removal Jurisdiction
Protection League v.
(28 U.S.C.
Administrators of
§ 1442(a)(1))
Tulane Educational

jarLny V. rJronson

U.S 2 91

500 U.S. 305

500 U.S. 344

States

§ 1951)

F'arrey, v.i anderfoot

Bankr1upI
IIt cy ( II

Owen v. Owen

Bankruptcy (11
U.S.C. § 522(f))

Sumit Heatlth, Ltd.
\' Pinhas
'
Braxton v. United
States

Sheorman Act (15United States
Sentencing

U.S.C.

500 U.S. 646

Clark v. Roemer

1072

548

524

119

62

57

236

128

108

170

123

47

166

75

91

410

1 16

224

415

235

180

150

92

58

723

504

219

109

54

55

534

479

55

uonnneient

Conditions (28 U.S.C.

,0 )
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1983)

Voting Rights Act of
1965 (42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c)
enxut
1

7501 U.S. 78

Hompi
Johnaon"T %-.

501 U.S. 89

Melkonyan v. Sullivan Equal Access to
Justice Act (28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(B))
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501 U.S. 115
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Gollust v. Mendell

501 U.S. 129
501 U.S. 157

Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934
§ 16(b) (15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b))
Bankrtcy 1

Toibb v. Radloff

Bankruptcy (11
I
ST

U.S. 350

Lampf, Pleva,
Securities and
Lipkind, Prupis &
Exchange Act of 1934
Petigrow v. Gilbertson § 10(b) (15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b)); SEC Rule
10b-5 (CFR
§240.10b-5)

Houston Lawyers
Ass'n v. Attorney

Du1 U.0. oil I

Totals
Totals

I-l

Voting Rights Act of
1965 (42 U.S.C.
6 1971)

vVIsconsin ruDlIc

reural

Intervenor v. Mortier

Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (7
U.S.C. §§ 136v,

190

91

99

50

330

124

507

2312

2757

1584

894

690

149

47

102

658

286

372

581

529

52

39,875
39,875

21,946
21,946

17,929
17,929

iinSecLlCiue,
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APPENDIX TABLE B:
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION CASES
IN THE 1984 TERM
Citation

Case

i

49U'S. 8L'
.Uie
Statj Ies
469 U.S. 45 United States v.
Abel
469 U.S. 70
469 U.S. 70

United State
Pow\ell
Garcia v. United

Commissioner

Statute/Subject
.R

n.69e

Law
Review
Citations

805

179

1171

515

148

163

814

142

270

40

115

141

22

66

707

1

52

1153

148

585

2021

1143

150

488

134

197

F. R. EVID. 403 &

608(bo)

USC
Crimna (i121
Criminal (18 U.S.C.
-1I -

I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(l),
368(a)(1)(A)
Copyight ( 17 USC

469 U.S. 189 Park N'Fly, Inc. v. Trademark Act of
Dollar Park and Fly, 1946 (Lanhan Act)
(15 U.S.C. §§ 1065,
Inc.
1115(b))
469 U.S. 241 United Staitesv
469 U.S. 256 Lawrence County v.
Lead-Deadwood
School District No.
40-1
nye
469 U(I 274 (Thin

Federal
Citations Appellate
Citations

Payment in Lieu of
Taxes Act (31 U.S.C.
§ 6902(a))

lsnknipteyv (I1I
U.S.C. § 104(4I)(h))
469 U.S. 287 Alexander v. Choate Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (29 U.S.C.
§ 794)

976

6

CiCl§§ 7602, 7t609
4691JS

UnitedonS
t
464 Brandon v.Holt

11

Riht Ac
Civi

(42'

unemicai
uiean vvater AcL
Manufacturers Ass'n § 301() (33 U.S.C.
v. Natural Resources § 1311()

2005]
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470 U.S. 184 Heckler v. Turner

County of Oneida v.
Oneida Indian

470 U.S. 451 National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v.
Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railway

Social Security Act
(42 U.S.C. I 602(a))

143

46

24

Trade & Intercourse
Act of 1790 (1 Stat.
229)

562

92

298

Article 17 (49 U.S.C.

435

43

213

232

49

59

55

1

7

77

32

20

4741

149

3

429

243

71

Rail Passenger
Service Act of 1970
(45 U.S.C. §§ 541,
561, 565)

v. Bartow County
Board of Tax

41v u.o. ooo nenneti v. ArentucKy rlementary ann
Department of
Secondary Education
Education
Act (20 U.S.C.
§§ 241, 1234)
47,0 U.'S. 7,29 FloridaL Raweri &
Hob,1, Ac t (28 U..t
Ligh1t (Ce. v. Lorimn
470 U.S. 768 Lindahl v. Office of
Federal Government
Personnel
Disability
Management
Retirement Program
(5 U.S.C. §§ 7703,
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470 U.S. 856 Ball v. United States Criminal (18 U.S.C.
§ 922(h)(1); 18 U.S.C.
App. § 1202(a)(1))

471 U.S. 48

4 11 U.,). 10ZI

Southern Motor
Carriers Rate
Conference, Inc. v.

Lft V. mms

Sherman Act (15
U.S.C. § 1)

555

238

98

529

65

228

164

43

53

1845

354

252

846

354

826

46

247

671

187

285

r reeoom o

Information Act (5
TT 0

471 U.S. 202 Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck

0

£

-O\

Labor Management
Relations Act (29
U.S.C. 6 185(a))

Civil Rights Act (42
U.S.C. § 1983); New
Mexico Tort Claims
Act (N.M. STAT. ANN.

U.b. 34

UommoOsty Vutures bankruptcy (11
Trading Commission U.S.C. §§ 761-766)

States
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(7 U.S.C.
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471 U.S. 524 Connecticut
Medicaid Act (42
Department of
U.S.C. § 1296d)
Income Maintenance

4 i

u.0.

471 U..

411

110

34

23

necurlnes icu oi
1933 (15 U.S.C.
§ 77); Securities
Exchange Act of
19 24 (15 TTR C &7M

437

91

50

707 Hillsborough County Public Health
v. Automated
Service Act § 351 (42
Medical
U.S.C. § 252(d))

959

109

375

258

49

129

204

83

60

ool

uureul
sipiier
Co. v. Landreth

u. n. ioj viontana v.
Blackfeet Tribe of

indian lvnineral
Leasing Act of 1938

4(1 U. . nun U. lanoma uty v.

U
k

411 U.n.

uriminal ib

on cusseu V. Unltea
States

472 U.h. 115 Atkins v. Parker

l\, ggts
u

Act 42

§ 844(I))

odir btamp
Act
S
Arxt (7
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472 U.S. 181 Lowe v. SEC

Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 (15

324

23

168

U.S.C. § 1);
Wholesale
Stationers, Inc. v.
Robinson-Patman
Pacific Stationery & Price Discrimination

1011

82

442

jonson v. Mcayor oi Age iuiscrimlnaon
Baltimore
in Employment Act
of 1967 (29 U.S.C.

148

21

43

982

128

443

527

108

242

619

136

254

-T oI -

.

o

Aspen biuing

o.V.

Aspen Highlands

4I2 U./. h -

4 IL u.
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OA
-

\\

51nermanAct (l

U.S.C. § 2)

United atates v.

. OqO oean V. ±NeiSOin

Lmiliilgraulon alo

Nationality Act (8
U.S.C.
§§ 1182(d)(5)(A),
1225(b));
Administrative
Procedure Act (5
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20051
473 U.S. 52

4i(

U.n. 1o

United States v.
Shearer

Federal Tort Claims
Act (28 U.S.C.

348

127

90

League of North

Relations Act (29

351

45

126

3031

506

190

1918

307

823

811

104

330

283

63

21

63,758

13,128

17,782

IxsenucKy

nureau oi

State Police v.
Graham

UIVII

lgnts

A-cT;4Z

U.S.C. § 1983); Civil
Rights Attorney's
Fees Award Act of
1976 (42 U.S.C.
£ 1 o.\

. 204 Atascaoero btate

Hospital v. Scanlon

renaonitation Act ot
1973 § 504 (29 U.S.C.

Thomas v. Union
Federal Insecticide,
Carbide Agricultural Fungicide, and
Products Co.
Rodentcide Act (7
U.S.C.

0- UCO

1o 'UUiCUIlIlIUII V. 1NflbU[

ilnte~rstate

n~greemeni

on Detainers (N.J.
STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:159A-1 et seq.)
Totals
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APPENDIX TABLE C:
REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR 1990 TERM
Case Citations (Log Log)
-1.10"*
X Coefficient
(0.16)
3.56
Constant
(0.21)
R2

0.83

df
N

10
12

Noncase Citations (Log Log)
-1.28**
X Coefficient
(0.19)
3.9
Constant
(0.23)
R2

0.83

df
N

10
12

Case versus Noncase Citations
0.23*
X Coefficient
(0.10)
199.65
Constant
(315.44)
R2

0.07

63
df
65
N
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
** p < .01

*p <.025
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APPENDIX TABLE D:
REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR 1984 TERM
Federal Appellate Citations (Log Log)
-1.84**
X Coefficient
(0.27)
5.38
Constant
(0.26)
0.87
R2

Law Review Citations (Log Log)
X Coefficient
Constant

-1.56**
(0.26)
4.78
(0.25)

R2

0.83

df
N

7
9

Federal Appellate Citations versus
Law Review Citations
0.30*
X Coefficient
(0.12)
160.43
Constant
(204.53)
R2
0.07
84
df
86
N
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
**p <.01
* p < .05
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